Slovakia: Uncertain Outlook for Elections

The makeup of Slovakia’s future government following the upcoming 17 June parliamentary elections is now nearly impossible to predict. Although public opinion polls indicate a strong lead for the populist opposition Smer (Direction), the actual results may be quite different, as recent elections have been characterized by a surprisingly low turnout and better-than-expected results for the ruling parties. Some analysts are predicting that Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda may even be able to retain his job for a third-consecutive term.

The elections were moved forward by three months following the exit of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) from Slovakia’s centre-right government in early February, based on Dzurinda’s failure to support a treaty with the Vatican on conscientious objection. The ruling coalition now consists of just two parties: Dzurinda’s Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) and the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK). Despite the recent squabble, relations between the three erstwhile partners are otherwise fairly good, and the establishment of a three-party government after the elections remains a real option, should they achieve a parliamentary majority.

Very positive economic indicators in recent months would seemingly help raise support for the ruling parties, but public opinion polls show that Smer has by far the highest backing among the electorate, at around 31–37%. The opposition Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), led by former prime minister Vladimir Meciar, is in second place; although at 11–13%, its support is a far cry from the levels recorded in the 1990s. The SDKU, SMK, and KDH are close behind the HZDS, with public backing of around 8–11%.

While those five parties are almost sure to surpass the 5% threshold for entry to the parliament, an element of uncertainty revolves around the prospects for three additional parties: the Free Forum (SF), the Slovak National Party (SNS), and the Communists. The SF was established by a group of deputies who quit the SDKU in 2003, and recent opinion polls put it above the 5% threshold. However, it is not clear that they will pass the electoral threshold, as they compete for the same votes with the more-powerful SDKU. The SNS, for its part, played a key role in the HZDS-led governments of the 1990s, but failed to enter the parliament in 2002. Although the SNS has since registered a resurgence, it may compete with Smer for votes, as both parties tend to utilize nationalist/populist rhetoric. Finally, support for the Communists, which made it to the parliament in 2002 for the first time since 1990, will depend on Smer’s ability to draw in leftist voters.

In any case, public opinion surveys may not be the best predictor of the electoral outcome, as Smer’s actual election results have never been as high as indicated by opinion polls. In the 2002 elections, SDKU unexpectedly prevailed over Smer to take second place behind HZDS, allowing Dzurinda to retain the post of prime minister. In the June 2004 elections to the European Parliament and the November 2005 elections to the regional assemblies, the ruling parties recorded surprisingly good results, as they proved better able to mobilize their voters.

Given the recent very low turnouts,, the ability of parties to mobilize core supporters will be crucial in determining the June outcome. Voter participation may be especially low since the elections are being held on one day — a Saturday — rather than the traditional two-day ballot. A low turnout typically benefits the SMK, which has a devoted base among ethnic Hungarian voters. It may be especially problematic for opposition parties without a stable base, such as Smer and the SF. In fact, Smer’s backing among voters who are sure to take part in the elections is estimated at less than 25%.

By the time of the elections, Dzurinda will have served as prime minister for almost eight years, and change would in certain respects be healthy. Nonetheless, the alternatives are not very attractive, particularly if Slovakia is to maintain its image as an “investors’ paradise.” Smer has called for a reversal of several key reforms implemented in 2003–05: advocating the abolishment of the flat tax on personal income, the introduction of a reduced rate of value-added tax (VAT) on certain goods, the reversal of several privatization deals, and the cancellation of fees for medical visits. Those demands will hurt Smer’s chances of forming a coalition with the current ruling parties—in a February interview, SMK chairman Bela Bugar referred to Smer's program as "unacceptable," adding that its implementation could "ruin" the country.

The SDKU will be competing on a platform of international and economic success, in the hopes that a strengthening economy will convince voters to choose continuity rather than change. The party can take much of the credit for Slovakia’s recent economic advances, including a record 7.6% year-on-year surge in GDP during the fourth quarter, combined with strong growth in employment and real wages last year. Having overseen the recent fiscal reforms, Finance Minister Ivan Miklos is now shifting emphasis to the task of securing continued economic growth and development through changes to the education system, aimed at building a knowledge-based economy. Given its proven success and growth-oriented program, we expect that electoral support for the SDKU will be higher than the party’s backing in recent polls, particularly since the standoff with the KDH over the Vatican treaty should help the party gain support from more liberal voters. Nonetheless, if the SDKU, SMK, and KDH fail to achieve a parliamentary majority, it remains unclear how Dzurinda would form a government, particularly since cooperation with Smer is unlikely and Meciar’s inclusion in the next cabinet would raise eyebrows both at home and abroad.

Economic successes may not be enough to put Dzurinda back in the post of prime minister, although it is hoped they will help to convince the next government—whatever its form—to maintain a similar course. Although the election campaign is sure to be filled with populist promises, we expect that the future cabinet will stay largely on the current path, appealing to international investors and maintaining the fiscal discipline that is required to bring Slovakia into the Eurozone by the target date of January 2009.