by Thea Fourie
Following a peace agreement between the ruling Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) rebel movements, the civil war in mainland Angola officially ended on April 4, 2002. Despite this agreement, fighting—with dire humanitarian consequences—still rages on in the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda province. The conflict here has persisted for more than 50 years, nurtured by the strong beliefs of a local separatist movement, Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), and rooted in two irreconcilable differences. First, Cabinda separatists claim that the enclave has its own distinct identity, history, and culture; and even considers the MPLA’s occupation of the region following independence as illegal. For the Angolan government, and perhaps most Angolans outside Cabinda, the province is an integral part of the country—and independence, therefore, not an option. Second, and probably more important, is the fact that Cabinda currently accounts for more than 60% of the country’s oil production and is a crucial factor in the government’s future revenue base, especially at a time when the Angolan economy is geared for social and infrastructural recovery.
Last year, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) launched a full-scale military campaign throughout the entire Cabinda province. According to separatists, the war intensified in October 2002, when the Angolan army stepped up its operations there. Following the April peace agreement, the government deployed FAA forces (freed up from fighting UNITA) and, allegedly, newly incorporated UNITA soldiers to “all but vanquish the splintered separatist fractions of the FLEC.” In June 2003, the FAA reported that the army chief of the independent FLEC-FAC faction in Cabinda, Francisco Luemba, and six other high-ranking officers, had surrendered to the Angolan government. The officers said their decision to quit was based on “immense difficulties” within the FLEC-FAC movement.
Initial reports suggest that the war may finally be nearing an end. But the cost of peace has come, as usual, at a very steep price. In its 2003 report, Amnesty International cited numerous allegations of human rights abuses—as well as atrocities—against unarmed villagers in Cabinda. Although the recent fighting may be characterized as “low intensity” in military terms, it has had a severe impact on both the lives and livelihoods of the local population.
President Eduardo dos Santos has frequently said that the Angolan government is open to negotiations, and that the most plausible solution would grant some form of autonomy to Cabinda province. However, this solution would mean that the separatists need to soften their longstanding demand for independence. Moreover, the various separatist factions need to unify in order to negotiate a reasonable solution. This is not an unlikely scenario. According to the Institute of Security Studies in South Africa, several factions and individuals have already formed a FLEC-Platform to negotiate with the government under the leadership of Antonio Bento Bembe, former head of the FLEC-R. However, the FLEC is not yet part of the platform, which is a critical precondition to a long-term solution. Despite the uncertainty regarding the ongoing conflict in Cabinda, Angola’s overall internal risk rating has improved during the past few months.
