Election 2009: Lebanon's Western-Backed Coalition Claims Victory over Hizbollah-Led Rivals

Preliminary Results

After months of anticipation, Lebanon’s election results, although not yet official, appear to have finally settled the electoral score between the fiercely opposed "March 14" and "March 8" coalitions. Only hours after the last polling stations closed last night, the March 14 coalition, led by Saad Hariri and his Future Movement, began making claims of victory. Key wins in the Beirut I district and in Zahle revealed the win, although results for several districts—including the hotly contested Metn district—have yet to come in at the time of writing. According to preliminary results, provided by Now Lebanon, a pro-March 14 daily, the winning bloc could have scored as many as 70 seats in the country’s 128-seat parliament, which is equally divided between Christians and Muslims, nearly as many as were secured in the 2005 polls when March 14 held 72 seats. March 8, meanwhile, will not have made significant inroads from its 56 seats, although Hizbollah has confirmed that all of its 11 nominated candidates have secured seats in the new parliament.

Electoral Conduct

Overall the polls were conducted amid relative calm thanks to the 30,000 police and soldiers which were stationed at the 5,200 polling centres across 26 voting districts. A few skirmishes were reported between supporters of the different camps; however, none appear to have resulted in any significant incidents. However, many complaints appear to have been issued in some polling stations over long queuing times. However, the interior ministry reportedly allowed pollsters already in queues before 1900 to vote beyond the closing hour. Interior Minister Ziad Baroud announced that voter turnout was as high as 54%, the highest seen in years in Lebanon, according to Agence France-Presse (AFP). The polls show a significant improvement in electoral conduct thanks to the electoral law approved in September last year, which limited campaign spending and held the polls over one Sunday only. The 2005 polls came under a great deal of criticism: held over four consecutive Sundays those polls invited a great deal of electoral fraud. No significant reports have yet emanated from the thousands of international observers deployed at polling stations. However, this does not exclude the significant inflow of funds which entered the country in the months and weeks ahead of the polls from key external backers of the two camps for the purposes of buying votes and bolstering election campaigns.

The Two Camps

Aside from Saad Hariri’s Future Movement, Lebanon’s main Sunni political coalition, March 14, also includes Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and Amine Gemayel’s Phalange (both Christian-dominated parties) plus the Progressive Socialist Party led by Druze political heavyweight Walit Jumblatt. The alliance took its name from the Cedar Revolution, a popular show of force staged in Beirut in protest at the 2005 assassination of ex-premier Rafiq Hariri, Saad Hariri’s father. The legacy of these past four years has been dominated by the Hariri assassination; it was the most significant systemic shock to have hit Lebanon since the end of the country’s devastating 15-year civil war (1975-1990). Not only did it put an effective end to the 30-year political and military domination of Lebanon by Syria, it also divided the Lebanese political scene into, broadly speaking, pro and anti-Syrian camps. On the other side of the political spectrum is March 8, led by the armed Shi’a Hizbollah movement. Although Hizbollah held relatively few parliamentary seats after 2005, its political clout has been buoyed by an alliance with General Michel Aoun, who in 2005 returned from a 15-year political exile caused by his antipathy to Syrian dominance in Lebanon—only to join ranks with Syrian-backed Hizbollah in 2006. March 8 also includes another Shi’a party, the Amal Movement, which is led by former parliamentary speaker Nahib Berri. Thanks to their alliance with Aoun, who managed a wildly unanticipated landslide victory in the 2005 polls, the March 8 alliance held 56 seats in the outgoing parliament.

Since their 2005 electoral victory Western-backed March 14has attempted to steer the country into an era of "sovereignty", by which it means ridding Lebanon of Syrian and Iranian influence. On the other hand March 14 retains close relations with key Western allies, including the United States and France and has the life-line backing of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries which have proven significant financial supporters of the alliance. March 14 have also emphasised developing normalised relations with Syria, while a key political agenda has centred on the support for the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon which has been charged with probing the assassination of Rafiq Hariri of which both Syria and Hizbollah have been accused of involvement.

Outlook and Implications

March 14 Celebrates But Uncertainty Remains

With the score tallied in this national—even regional—popularity contest, the path ahead is by no means smooth. March 14 supporters may be celebrating their victory now but as most observers are busy pointing out, the potential for yet another political crisis is never far away in Lebanon and could certainly erupt in the aftermath of the polls. Much will depend on March 14’s conduct in coming days and weeks, and of course, on March 8’s acceptance of the election results.

As yet, there have been few reactions, aside from an admittance of defeat by the Aounists in the losing camp. However, it is unlikely that the polls will be strongly contested by either Hizbollah or its allies. Nevertheless, much as in 2005 when March 14 was obliged to include five March-8-affiliated ministers in the 30-seat cabinet, Hariri and his bloc will most likely once again create a coalition government. This could be the formula for yet another four years of political deadlock. The 2005 elections came so close on the back of the Hariri assassination that it is difficult to see how a smoothly operating government could have been put together. The electoral fervour from March 14 at the time coupled with the near-revolutionary spirit of having effectively dislodged Syrian dominance significantly reduced any potential for cooperation; the two sides were too busy playing a blame game.

Today the outlook is somewhat different and the Hizbollah-led March 8 may have to concede to terms set out by the winning majority, even if this is done after much political bickering and bargaining. Firstly March 14 has already been seen as having given conceded to Hizbollah’s demands several times in the past four years. Arguably it has also suffered a number of humiliating defeats by Hizbollah and March 8 outside the ballot box—the first being its inclusion of Hizbollah-affiliated representatives in the post-2005 cabinet, which firstly resulted in a sluggish political process and post-2007 effectively resulted in complete deadlock. The second defeat was Hizbollah’s devastating war with Israel in summer 2006 which Hizbollah subsequently claimed as a victory over the neighbouring arch-foe. The war left the March 14 government with an embarrassing aftertaste as Hizbollah took domestic and regional centre stage for fending off the Israeli military onslaught with its much-criticised arsenal while the Lebanese security forces were overshadowed. Furthermore, the war propelled Hizbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah to regional popularity for taking on Israel.

Finally, the outbreak of political violence in May 2008 which resulted from March 14’s attempt to curb Hizbollah’s growing powers by moving to dismantle its telecommunications network and replace the Hizbollah-backed head of security at Beirut’s International Airport, was another blow to March 14. The fears of a return to protracted political fighting were significantly heightened by Hizbollah’s jarring illustration that it was willing to use its arms not strictly as "resistance" to Israel, but domestically to protect its key strongholds and networks. Subsequently, these very fears pushed March 14 to agree to giving Hizbollah a veto-enabling one-third of seats in the new unity cabinet formed after a conciliation agreement was signed in Doha, Qatar in May 2008. Understandably this agreement was dubbed a victory for Hizbollah. In the end Hizbollah and Hassan Nasrallah paid no visible price for displaying its ability to stage an effective coup d’état.

In that sense the balance has shifted with the results of yesterday’s elections. March 14’s hand is significantly strengthened against Hizbollah in real terms. Its ability to point to the popular vote as an effective referendum could put an end to the special treatment which Hizbollah and March 8 have enjoyed thus far. Furthermore, although the Doha agreement secured the opposition a powers of veto in parliament, March 14 has repeatedly said it will not offer March 8 that position again. It thus appears likely that if March 8 is invited into government they will not hold enough powers to block the cabinet, even if they may be able to do so in parliament.

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